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NOTES
Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—State Purchasing Activity
Excluded from Commerce Clause Review—Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp.' Appellee, a Virginia scrap processing firm (Alexandria),
challenged the constitutional validity of a 1974 amendment 2 to a
Maryland regulatory schemes (the Act) seeking to rid the State of the
unsightly environmental problem created by abandoned automobiles. 4
At the heart of the Maryland remedial scheme is a "bounty''' paid by
the State for each abandoned automobile previously titled in Mary-
land° and recycled by a scrap processor licensed' under the Act." This
bounty was designed to create a financial incentive inducing vehicle
suppliers to deliver abandoned automobiles to scrap processors by
allowing the processors to pay amounts higher than the prevailing
market price for such vehicles." In order to obtain the bounty, the
amended Act required that scrap processors present the Maryland
Motor Vehicle Administration with one of five enumerated methods
of documenting title'° for each bounty-eligible vehicle processed by
the scrap processor.
426 U.S. 794 (1976).
2
 1 974  Md. Laws, c. 465, as codified in Mo. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(0(5)
(Supp. 1975).
Mn. ANN. Coot: art. 66 1/2, §§ 5-201-210 (N70).
426 U.S. at 796.
5 Ma ANN. Cone art. 66 1/2, § 5-205 (1970). The current bounty is $16.00. MD.
ANN. CODE art, 66 1/2, § 5-205 as amended (Supp. 1975). The statute requires that this
bounty he split evenly between the scrap processor and the licensed "wrecker" who de-
livers the vehicle. Id, A wrecker must be licensed as such under the act if it is "engaged
in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring vehicle's for the benefit of the ma-
terials contained therein or parts thereof." Mn. ANN. Cone. art. 66 1/2, § 5-201.1(b). If
the vehicle is delivered to a scrap processor by an unlicensed vehicle supplier—towing
services, vehicle haulers, or governmental agencies—the entire "bounty" is paid to the
scrap processor. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 797. In practice, however, a large portion of the
bounty paid to the scrap processor is rebated to the unlicensed supplier to assure con-
tinuing deliveries. Id. at 797-98 n.5. Alexandria, for example, rebates $14.00 of the
$16.00 "bounty" to its unlicensed suppliers. hi.
" Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 5-205 (1970 and Supp. 1975).
1
 In order to be qualified to participate in the "bounty" program, scrap pro-
cessors must first obtain a license front the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles,
Mn. ANN. Cone art. 66 1/2, § 5-201 (1970). This license entitles any scrap processor,
whether or not it is located in Maryland, to participate in the program. Id. Seven of the
sixteen licensed processors that participated in the program were firms conducting their
operations outside Maryland's borders. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 799.
° The bounty payments were designed to promote removal of abandoned vehicles
from the countryside by speeding the operation of the "scrap cycle." Hughes, 426 U.S. at
796. The scrap cycle is the course an automobile follows from abandonment by its
owner, to the auto wrecker who salvages parts and markets the hulk, to the scrap pro-
cessor who reduces the hulk to scrap marketable to steel mills, and finally to the steel
mills where the scrap is converted into new, usable steel. Id.
Id. at 797.
'° Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 5-205 (1970 and Supp. 1975). With these title
documentation requirements, the statute sought to eliminate the possiblity of conversion
suits brought by vehicle owners claiming that they had not abandoned their vehicles.
Hughes, 426 U.S. at 798. Fear of such suits constituted a major impediment to the oper-
ation of the scrap cycle. The Act originally provided four methods by which transfer of
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The crucial factor leading to the Hughes litigation arose from the
Act's amended provision dealing with documentation requirements
for those bounty-eligible vehicles which are both over eight years old
and without an engine or otherwise totally inoperable (hulks)." This
amendment placed a different burden for documenting title to these
vehicles on licensed processors whose plants are located outside Mary-
land than on those processors whose plants are located within the
State.' 2
 For vehicles in this "hulk" classification, Maryland scrap pro-
title to the vehicles could be documented. First, a vehicle owner or his assignee may en-
dorse a valid Certificate of Title to the vehicle supplier or scrap processor. Mn. A.
Coot: art. 66 1/2, § 5-203.1 (1970). Second, a person in possession of an abandoned ve-
hicle may apply to the local police department which may issue a Certificate of Author-
ity to deliver the vehicle for scrapping after the department has given a statutorily-
required three-week notice to previous owners. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 1I-
1002.2(1). Third, the purchaser of an abandoned vehicle at a police auction may obtain
an Auctioneer's Bill of Sale permitting him to deliver the vehicle to a scrap processor.
Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(d). Fourth, a licensed wrecker may secure a
"Wrecker's Certificate" upon compliance with a statutory notice procedure. Mn. ANN,
Com art. 66 1/2, § 5-203(b), (c). As originally enacted, the Act also provided for an ex-
ception from any title documentation requiremnt for those vehicles classified under the
statute as "hulks." Title to vehicles falling within the "hulk" classification was obtained
coincident with possession. Mn, ANN, Cone art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(0(5) (1970 and
Supp. 1975). The 1974 Amendment effectively eliminates this exception, by requiring
title documentation for hulks in the form of an indemnity agreement. Id. (Supp. 1975).
This fifth documentation requirement, however, was available only to Maryland scrap
processors, who were allowed to prove title to hulks simply by obtaining an indemnity
agreement from the vehicle supplier. Id. Under this amendment, out-of-state processors
were relegated to the first four methods of documenting title. See Id.
"See Mn. ANN. Cone: art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(f)(5) (1970).
' 2 1d. *11-1002.2(0(5) (1970 and Supp. 1975), provides, as amended:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, any person, firm,
corporation, or unit of government upon whose property or in whose pos-
session any abandoned motor vehicle is found, or any person being the
owner of a motor vehicle whose title certificate is faulty, or destroyed, or
any agent designated and authorized by a unit of government to remove
an abandoned motor vehicle from public or private property, may dispose
of the motor vehicle to a wrecker or scrap processor without the title and
without notification procedures of subsections (a) arid (b) of this section, if
the motor vehicle is over eight years old and has no engine or is otherwise
totally inoperable. In those cases only a scrap processor whose plant is physically
located and operating in this State shall execute an indemnity agreement that shall
be filed with the Motor Vehicle Administration. The indemnity agreement shall con-
tain the name, address and signature of the person delivering the vehicle. The in-
demnity agreement and the manufacturer's serial or identification number shall be
satisfactory proof that the vehicle has been destroyed and shall be acceptable for
payment of the full bounty authorized by § 5-205 if the vehicle identified in the in-
demnity agreement was titled in this State. Otherwise, for the purpose of administer-
ing the provisions of this section, the provisions of 5-205 shall not apply.
The 1974 amendment did not change the wording of the original section but added the
italicized portions.
The legislative rationale for discriminating between licensed scrap processors
operating within Maryland's borders and those licensed processors operating outside
the State is unclear. There is no legislative history regarding the purpose of the
amendment. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 63 (D. Md. 1975).
However, the amendment may have been deliberately designed to redirect delivery of
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cessors need only supply an indemnity agreement signed by the vehi-
cle supplier to document title to the vehicle and thus obtain the
bounty." In contrast, out-of-state processors like Alexandria had to
provide the Motor Vehicle Administration with one of the other
enumerated documents of title, which were much more difficult to ob-
tain than indemnity agreements.' 4
As an out-of-state processor, Alexandria's access to Maryland
vehicles proved extremely vulnerable to the type of changes made by
the 1974 amendment, particularly since ninety-six per cent of the
Maryland vehicles it processed fell into the "hulk" classification."
After the effective date of the amendment creating the different hulk
title documentation requirements, Alexandria suffered a dramatic de-
' cline in the number of bounty-eligible hulks delivered to it." Vehicle
suppliers for the most part began delivering their abandoned au-
tomobiles to Maryland processors rather than to those located out-of-
state." Alexandria attributed this decline to the operation of the
amendment, which made it easier for the vehicle suppliers merely to
sign an indemnity agreement than to go through the lengthy alterna-
tive procedures required when they, delivered vehicles to out-of-state
processors."
Following this decline, Alexandria filed suit in the Maryland
district court seeking both a declaratory judgment that the amend-
ment violated the commerce and equal protection clauses and an in-
junction restraining Maryland from enforcing it." Alexandria con-
tended that the amendment created an unconstitutional burden on in-
hulks toward Maryland processors and away from their licensed out-of-state com-
petitors. This possibility may be inferred from the heading of the proposed amend-
ment, which was "[f]or the purpose of protecting certain scrap processors who destroy
abandoned vehicleS." Hughes, 426 U.S. at 826 n.7 (emphasis in the original). Not-
withstanding this factor, Maryland contended throughout the litigation that the purpose
of the amendment was to promote the State's interest in assuring that its bounty pay-
ments went only for the processing of those vehicles which had been actually aban-
doned in Maryland. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 391 F. Supp. at 63. Since any abandoned
vehicle was eligible for the bounty if it was previously titled in Maryland, Mu. ANN.
Cone art, 66 1/2, § 5-205 (1970 and Supp. 1975), the bounty has to be paid even for
those Maryland hulks which are actually abandoned outside the State.
" Mu. ANN. Cone art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(0(5) (1970 and Supp. 1975). This re-
quirement created little difficulty for Maryland scrap processors since these indemnity
agreements were already required by scrap processors in the normal course of business
operations. Id. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 801.
" See .supra note 10.
" Hughes, 426 U.S. at 800.
" "During the six-month period immediately preceding the effective date of the
amendment, appellee received 14,253 hulks from Maryland sources. In the six months
immediately thereafter, the total was 9,723. This marked a decline of 31.8% in the
number of bounty-eligible hulks, at a time when appellee's figures showed an increase of
11.9% in the number of vehicles supplied from non-Maryland sources." Hughes, 426
U.S. at 801 n.11 (emphasis in original).
"1d. at 802.
" Id.
"Alexandria Scrap Corp. v, Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.Md. 1975). With re-
spect to the equal protection issue, Alexandria contended that the amendment violated
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terstate commerce in hulks by effectively barring out-of-state pro-
cessors from access to these bounty-eligible vehicles.20
Maryland countered Alexandria's allegations with a two-fold de-
fense. First, the State maintained that commerce clause review of the
bounty scheme was inappropriate, since Maryland's activity under the
scheme was state proprietary activity, and, as such, constituted a type
of activity excluded from commerce clause review. 21
 Second, the State
contended that the benefit the Act conferred on Maryland out-
weighed the burden placed on interstate commerce by the amend-
ment's operation."
Rejecting both of Maryland's contentions, the three-judge
panel" granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and issued an in-
junction prohibiting Maryland from enforcing the amendment." In
reaching its decision that the amendment violated the commerce
clause, the district court first determined that although state pro-
prietary activity may be excluded from commerce clause review, Mary-
land's role under the bounty scheme was "governmental" rather than
"proprietary" in nature. 25
 The court noted that Maryland's contention
that its activities were proprietary in nature "comports neither with
established legal principles nor with the facts." 26
The district court then subjected the bounty scheme to review
under the commerce clause. In doing so, the court first recognized
that the Maryland scheme did not directly regulate interstate com-
merce, but only burdened it as an incidental effect of the bounty pro-
gram's operation." The district court further observed that the
bounty scheme was enacted to promote Maryland's legitimate state in-
terest in obtaining an aesthetically-pleasing environment, and that the
amendment helped assure that the State's bounty payments went to
the equal protection clause in that it was not rationally related to promoting the as-
serted state environmental objective. Id. at 56.
20 Id. at 61-62.
21 Id. at 54-55. This "proprietary activity" exclusion to commerce clause review is
premised on the theory that government powers are divisible into two categories: "pro-
prietary" and "governmental." A government's proprietary or business power is the
means used by the State to act for its private advantage, as opposed to government's
"governmental" powers, where the State acts as sovereign, Several courts have held that
when a government exercises its proprietary powers, it is not subject to the contraints of
the commerce clause. See, e.g., American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719,
721-25 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); State ex rel. Collins v.
Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917);
Tribune Printing and Binding, Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898).
See text at notes 87-109 infra for a more detailed discussion of this proprietary exclu-
sion to commerce clause review.
" 391 F. Supp. at 56-57, 63.
" Since the constitutionality of a state statute was involved in the suit, a three-
judge panel was convened pursuant to the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed
Pub. L. 94-381 § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1970)).







process vehicles actually abandoned within Maryland's borders." In
light of these circumstances, the district court determined that the ap-
propriate standard for reviewing the Maryland amendment under the
commerce clause was a test which balanced the benefit it conferred on
Maryland against the degree to which the amendment burdened in-
terstate commerce. 2 "
The district court's conclusion that a balancing test was the ap-
propriate standard of review followed from its determination that the
Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Pike v. Bruce Church, inc." set forth
the controlling standard. 31 In Pike, the Supreme Court declared that
when confronted with state legislation incidentally burdening in-
terstate commerce, whose primary purpose is to promote a legitimate
state interest, the legislation should be sustained unless either the ben-
efit it confers is clearly outweighed by the burden it imposes on in-
terstate commerce, or the state goal can be achieved equally well by
means less burdensome to interstate commerce." The district court in
Hughes applied the Pike balancing test and held that the 1974 amend-
ment violated the commerce clause. In striking the balance, the dis-
trict court maintained that the 1974 amendment substantially bur-
dened interstate commerce in vehicle hulks" and that the state goals
2 " Id. at 48-49, 63.
211 1d. at 59.
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
31 391 F. Supp. 46, 59.
32 397 U.S. at 142.
33
 391 F. Supp. at 62-63. The district court found that the 1974 amendment bur-
dened interstate commerce in two ways. First, the amendment burdened commerce by
"reshaping" the abandoned vehicle market in a manner favorable to Maryland pro-
cessors and adverse to licensed out-of-state processors. Id. This restructuring of the
market arose because the differing tide documentation requirements left vehicle
suppliers with the choice of either delivering the vehicles to Maryland processors and
merely signing an indemnity agreement to obtain part of the bounty, or delivering the
vehicles to non-Maryland processors and having to go through the burdensome
alternative procedures necessary to document title. Id. at 62. Referring to this aspect of
the amendment, the court observed that:
[s]ince [this] choice ... will in many, if not all, instances be made by in-
dividuals with no interest in maintaining Alexandria Scrap's economic
health and a considerable interest in maintaining their own economic
health, the choice which will in most instances be made [i.e., delivery to
Maryland processorS] is rather predictable and almost inevitable.
The second way in which the amendment burdened interstate commerce, the dis-
trict court found, was that the amendment
not only ... effectively protect[s] scrap processors with existing plants in
Maryland from the pressures .
 of competitors with nearby out-of-state
plants, but it implicitly offers to extend similar protection to any com-
petitor who is willing to erect a scrap processing facility within Maryland's
boundaries—an offer clearly suspect under Commerce Clause principles.
Id. at 63. This determination followed from the district court's examination of Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which Justice Stewart, speaking for a unan-
imous Court, declared that the Court viewed state statutes which, in effect, required
business operations to be performed in-state which could be more efficiently ac-
complished out-of-state as being "virtually per se illegal." Id. at 145. Cf. Toomer v. Wit-
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promoted by the amendment could be achieved equally well by means
less burdensome to interstate commerce."
Maryland appealed the district court's decision directly to the
Supreme Court" on both the commerce clause and equal protection
issues. The State did not, however, question the lower court's finding
that the bounty scheme fell outside the ambit of the proprietary ex-
clusion." The Court reversed and HELD: "Nothing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising
the right to favor its own citizens over others." 37
The Court, in reaching its decision, drew a sharp distinction be-
tween two different types of state activity burdening interstate com-
merce. In the first type, the State directly prohibits or indirectly bur-
dens interstate commerce through legislation regulating private con-
duct. 38 In the second type, the State intervenes directly into the mar-
ket as a "purchaser" to favor in-state businesses." While observing
that the first type of activity is properly a subject of commerce clause
review, 40 the Court determined that the second type of activity is not
subject to such review.' This latter determination flowed from its
sell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-04, 406 (1948) (South Carolina statute requiring shrimp boats
fishing off its coast to dock and pack their catch in the State held unconstitutional);
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. I, 12-14 (1928) (Louisiana statute
which forbade exporting Louisiana shrimp until they had been shelled and beheaded
held unconstitutional).
" 391 F. Supp. at 63. The district court found that the state purpose promoted
by the Maryland amendment—assuring that the bounty payments went to pay for only
those vehicles actually abandoned in Maryland—could be achieved equally well by
means less burdensome to interstate commerce by the "simple, nondiscriminatory expe-
dient of denying bounty payments to any processor for any vehicle abandoned outside
of Maryland's geographical limits." Id. The district court also found that the amend-
ment violated the equal protection clause, since the amendment "creates a classification
which has no basis in reason." Id. at 58.
" Hughes, 426 U.S. at 802. Maryland obtained direct appeal through the pro-
visions of 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
36 426 U.S. at 796.
37 Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
38 1d. at 806.
3"
	
at 806, 808. The distinction between these two types of state activity which
may result in a burden on interstate commerce can be illustrated by the following: in
the first type of activity, the State, through its rule-making powers, enacts legislation
aimed at regulating private conduct, which, in turn, results in a modification of private
behavior in a manner which is adverse to interstate commerce. An example of a burden
placed on interstate commerce in this manner is a state statute requiring shrimp boats
fishing off its coast to dock in the State and pack their catch there. See, e.g., Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-04, 406 (1948). The second type of state activity which may
burden interstate commerce is state purchasing. In contrast to the first type of activity
where the State regulates private activity, state purchasing involves direct state entry
into the market to obtain items it needs for its own benefit. An example of a burden
placed on interstate commerce is a state statute limiting its purchasing of printed forms
to those produced by its own citizens. See, e.g., American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.
Supp. 719, 719-21, 725 (mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
" 426 U.S. at 806, 808 n.17.
41 Id. at 808-09.
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conclusion—made without further explanation—that the commerce
clause does not "require independent justification" of the manner in
which a State exercises its power to purchase articles of interstate
commerce."
Applying this distinction between different types of burdens
placed on commerce, the Court concluded that Maryland was a "pur-
chaser" under its bounty scheme." This conclusion was based on the
Court's finding that the hulks remained in Maryland "in response to
market forces, including that exerted by money from the State", 44
rather than due to state legislation regulating private conduct result-
ing in an indirect burden on interstate commerce.'" Accordingly, the
burden on interstate commerce created by the amendment resulted
from the type of state activity which is not subject to commerce clause
review." The Court therefore determined that the commerce clause
required neither the application of a balancing test nor any other type
of commerce clause review. 47
Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion in which he suggested
that the critical factor in Hughes rested on the hypothesis that the
Maryland bounty scheme "created" new commerce which did not exist
prior to the Act." Justice Stevens noted that prior Supreme Court
cases concerning the commerce clause dealt with state activity which
interfered with the natural operation of pre-existing commerce." In
contrast, Justice Stevens reasoned that the Hughes Court is "dealing
with a business that is dependent on the availability of subsidy pay-
ments."5° As such, there is no place for commerce clause review be-
cause the commerce clause proscribes only state interference with exist-
ing commerce, not state activity giving rise to new commerce. 5 ' Justice
Stevens thus concluded that Hughes was correctly decided because the
commerce clause does not "inhibit a State's power to experiment with
different methods of encouraging local industry." 52
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and White, vigor-
ously dissented from the majority's exclusion of state purchasing from
the scope of commerce clause review. 53 The dissent initially main-
tained that all state activity indirectly burdening interstate commerce
" Id, at 809.
" Id. at 808.
44 Id. at 810.
" Id. at 809-10.
" Id. at 810.
41 Id.
" Id. at 815.16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
sold at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" Id. at 817 (Stevens, J., concurring). In so concluding, Justice Stevens noted that
"the Commerce Clause [was) intended (at least when Congress has not spoken) to
inhibit the several States' power to create restrictions on the free flow of goods within
the national market, rather than to provide the basis for questioning a State's right to
experiment with different incentives to business." N.
as
	 at 816 (Stevens, J., concurring).
as Id, at 817-19 (B re n nan, J., dissenting).
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must be scrutinized under the Pike balancing test. 54 Moreover, the dis-
sent indicated that they would hold facially invalid any state statute
which, either on its face or in practical effect, limited state purchasing
to goods produced in-state, unless the State could show that some
legitimate interest "other than economic protectionism" was promoted
thereby. 55
Although the dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that state purchasing activity burdening commerce was exempt from
review, it nevertheless argued in the alternative that "even those
courts ... that have concluded that facially restrictive state purchasing
statutes are permissible under the Commerce Clause ... have re-
stricted this conclusion to instances where the State in a 'proprietary'
capacity is purchasing items of commerce for end use ...." 56 The dis-
sent accordingly suggested that if a "purchasing" exclusion was to be
adopted, it should be limited to instances where a State purchases
items for its own end use. 57 Under the Hughes fact situation, however,
the dissent contended that by the bounty scheme, Maryland was
merely engaged in price-enhancing activity rather than purchasing
items of interstate commerce for its own end use. 59 The dissent there-
fore maintained that the majority had incorrectly concluded that
Maryland's bounty scheme came within the ambit of a purchasing ex-
clusion to commerce clause review. 59
Since the dissent felt that the Pike balancing test was applicable
to Hughes, the dissenters concluded that the case should have been
remanded to the district court for a full trial because it came to the
Supreme Court in summary judgment posture." Such a course of ac-
tion was necessary, in its view, to determine both the degree to which
the bounty scheme burdened interstate commerce and the degree to
which Maryland's environmental goals could be promoted equally well
by means less burdensome to commerce."
The significance of the Hughes decision is two-fold. First, it
creates a broad exclusion from commerce clause review of state activ-
ity which may be characterized as "purchasing." Prior to Hughes, no
Supreme Court decision had held that any type of state activity was
expressly outside the scope of commerce clause review if it in some
manner burdened interstate commerce." Second, the decision ac-
quires an additional dimension when read in conjunction with National
54 Id. at 818-19, 827-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 823 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
55 Id. The dissent also suggested that the State may have been engaged in pur-
chasing the "service" of scrap processing. Id. See discussion of this aspect of the dissent
in text at notes 126-31 infra.
5' 426 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
°° Id. at 831-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
611d .
62 Cf. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-72 (1976) (applying
a balancing test to state legislation which indirectly created a burden on interstate corn-
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League of Cities v. Usery," 3 which was decided the same day. National
League of Cities, by holding that Congress exercising its power. under
the commerce clause could not regulate the minimum wages and
maximum hours of those state employees engaged in providing "tradi-
tional governmental functions,"" limits the scope of the commerce
clause's affirmative grant of power to Congress. Conversely, Hughes,
by holding that state purchasing activity burdening interstate com-
merce is not subject to commerce clause review, limits the sphere in
which the commerce clause operates negatively to proscribe state legis-
lation which burdens interstate commerce. Taken together, National
League of Cities and Hughes thus seem to represent part of a major re-
structuring by the Court of the commerce clause's operative scope.
After an introductory discussion of prior Supreme Court pre-
cedent regarding the scope of commerce clause review of state legisla-
tion burdening commerce, this note will investigate possible rationales
underlying the restriction placed upon the scope of that review by the
Hughes decision. In so doing, the note will examine the "proprietary
activity" exclusion from commerce clause review, which, although
never expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court, has nevertheless,
been applied by state and lower federal courts in excluding pro-
prietary purchasing activity from commerce clause review. The note
will then examine the relationship between this proprietary exclusion
and the Hughes decision, concluding that the Hughes decision may be
grounded on an implicit, approving recognition of the proprietary
exclusion. Thereafter, the apparent scope of the Hughes purchasing
exclusion will be compared with the scope of the proprietary exclu-
sion, which will reveal that the scope of the Hughes purchasing exclu-
sion may go well beyond the limitations applicable to the proprietary
activity exclusion. The possible rationales for this expansive exclusion
of all State purchasing from commerce clause review will then be dis-
cussed. Finally, the note will examine the nature and scope of the
Hughes purchasing exclusion and discuss its appropriateness on both
public policy and substantive law grounds. It will be submitted that
Hughes creates an unwarranted exclusion to commerce clause` review
which should not be followed by the Court in subsequent cases involv-
ing state activity alleged to create an indirect burden on interstate
commerce.
I. THE IMPACT OF HUGHES ON THE SCOPE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE
REVIEW
The Hughes Court's determination that state purchasing in-
merce); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (same). But cf. American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 409 U.S. 904 (1972), airs . mem. 339 F. Stapp. 719 (M.D. Fla.)
(mem.) (affirming in a memorandum opinion a three-judge district court decision which
excluded state proprietary activity from commerce clause review).
es
	U.S. 833 (1976).
54 Id. at 852.
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directly burdening interstate commerce is excluded from commerce
clause review stands in sharp contrast to prior Supreme Court pre-
cedent in the commerce clause area. 65 Unlike a situation in which a
State enacts legislation aimed directly at curtailing or disrupting in-
terstate commerce," the adverse effect of the Maryland bounty pro-
gram on interstate commerce arises only incidentally to the primary
purpose of the Act, which is to promote the recycling of abandoned
automobiles. 67 Prior to its decision in Hughes, the Court has always
held that such indirect, state-created burdens are within the scope of
commerce clause review. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held
that the appropriate standard by which to judge the validity of this
type of legislation is a balancing test." This balancing test applied by
the Court is set forth in the Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly" to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, 70 and its effects on interstate
" See note 62 supra.
" When faced with state legislation aimed directly at regulating interstate com-
merce, the Cotirt has held that the State is totally without legislative authority to do so
and has therefore summarily rejected the state legislation. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers
Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1925), which involved a comprehensive North
Dakota regulatory scheme governing the sale and transportation of wheat, 90% of
which was shipped in interstate commerce. The Shafer Court, concluding that the stat-
ute was invalid, noted that "a state statute which by its necessary operation directly in-
terferes with or burdens ... [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation and in-
valid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted." Id. at 199 (emphasis added). See
also Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 61 (1922) (statute similar to that involved
in Shafer held to violate the commerce clause).
61 Hughes, 426 U.S. at 796.
68 Cf. Great Ad.	 Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-72 (1976) (Mis-
sissippi statute barring milk and milk products from other States from being sold in
Mississippi unless the state from which the milk was imported accepted similar Mis-
sissippi products considered-by the Court as creating an indirect burden warranting re-
view under a balancing test); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)
(Arizona statute regulating packaging of fruit created indirect burden on interstate
commerce warranting the application of a balancing test).
6" For cases presenting state statutes which the Court has viewed as taking effect
evenhandedly, see Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 446 (1946) (state regulation of
insurance agents applied to all agents whether they represent in-state or out-of-state
companies and whether the business done is interstate or local in character); South
Carolina State Hwy. Dept v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938) (statute set-
ting truck width and weight maximums). For cases involving state statutes which the
Court has viewed as operating in a discriminatory manner against out-of-state pro-
ducers, see Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976) (Mississippi
statute barring milk and milk products from other States from being sold in Mississippi
unless the state from which the milk was imported accepted milk and milk products
produced in Mississippi); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361,
375-77 (1964) (Florida statute requiring milk distributors to purchase certain classifica-
tions of milk from designated Florida producers at a fixed price); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22, 528 (1935) (New York statute making it illegal to im-
port milk into the state which was purchased at prices less than those prescribed by
New York's minimum price laws).
" A wide variety of state statutes have been held to promote a legitimate state in-
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commerce are only incidental," it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benelits7 2... If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest in-
volved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities."
The Court has concluded that the application of a balancing test
is necessary in order to accommodate two conflicting interests. 74 On
terest. See, e.g., Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 447 (1946) (state regulation of in-
surance business); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346, 352 (1939)
(Pennsylvania statute regulating milk industry); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 349-50
(1933) (New York statute requiring that cattle imported into the State be inspected and
certified as free from disease).
7 ' The following cases involved what the Court characterized as merely incidental
burdens on interstate commerce: California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 114 (1941);
Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 353 (1939); South Carolina
State Hwy. Dept v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938); Townsend v.
Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 459 (1937).
In the following cases the Court has found state legislation to create more than
an incidental burden on commerce and declared the statutes unconstitutional: Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 377 (1964) (statute requiring com-
mercial buyers of milk to buy certain qualities of milk at. fixed prices from designated
sellers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (Illinois statute
requiring trucks to use an unusual type of mud flap); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madi-
son, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (city ordinance, purportedly enacted as a health measure,
prohibiting the sale of pasteurized milk unless it had been processed and bottled at an
approved pasteurization plant within a five mile radius or Madison).
" The burden placed on interstate commerce was held to be clearly excessive in
relation to the benefit obtained by the State in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424
U.S. 366, 380 (1976) (asserted state health interest promoted by Louisiana statute for-
bidding sale of milk imported from States not having reciprocal sales agreement with
Louisiana held outweighed by the burden imposed on the interstate sale of milk from
states not having reciprocity agreement): Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
145-46 (1970) (Arizona's interest in identifying place of origin of appellee's canteloupes
was outweighed by the burden imposed on interstate commerce if the state were
allowed to enjoin the shipping of canteloupes across state borders under an act de-
signed to eliminate deceptive packaging); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, inc., 359 U.S.
520, 529-30 (1959) (minimal state interest in prescribing the use of unusual mudflaps
on trucks held insufficient to outweigh the burden statute placed on trucking company
engaged in interstate commerce); and Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945) (state law regulating train lengths so impeded the economic
and efficient operation of interstate carriers as to outweigh the minimal state health and
safety interest conferred on the State by the statute).
73 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (1970) (footnotes added). The Court has noted that the
purported goal of the legislation burdening commerce could be achieved by less bur-
densome means in Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1976);
Dean Milk Co. V. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S.
511, 524 (1935).
"See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-72 (1976);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945); Union
Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1944); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,
362 (1943).
903
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the one hand, congressional power under the commerce clause is
"plenary", in the interstate commerce area. 75 In light of this plenary
grant of power to Congress, it is wet! settled that the commerce clause,
standing alone, bars state activity which infringes upon federal author-
ity in the interstate commerce sphere. 7e On the other hand, not-
withstanding this plenary grant of congressional power, it has also
been long recognized that the States, absent conflicting federal legisla-
tion, retain a "residuum of power"77
 to enact legislation which pro-
motes legitimate state interests, even though such legislation may, in
operation, create a burden on interstate commerce. 78 One conse-
quence of applying this balancing test, therefore, is that state legisla-
tion seeking to promote a legitimate local interest which indirectly
burdens interstate commerce will sometimes be upheld owing to the
significance of the local interests involved. 75
The Hughes Court, by rejecting the district court's application of
the Pike balancing test to the Maryland bounty scheme, held for the
first time that a type of state activity which indirectly burdens in-
terstate commerce may be totally excluded from commerce clause re-
view. The creation of this "purchasing" exclusion has the result of
sharply restricting the sphere of state activity in which the commerce
clause acts to inhibit state legislation from indirectly burdening in-
terstate corn merce.
" See, e.g., South Carolina Hwy. Dept v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189
(1938).
"Id. at 185-86.
" Southern Pac. Co. v: Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
79
 The Court has long recognized that the States have power to "legislate protec-
tion of their citizens in matters of local concern", Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976), provided that the benefit thus conferred on their citizens
outweighs the resultant burden the legislation places on interstate commerce. See cases
cited at notes 70.72 supra.
79
 The Court has on occasion upheld state legislation placing an indirect burden
on interstate commerce because some social problems are both so local in scope and
peculiar in nature that ameliorating state legislation must be sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the state's police power. The Court has further noted that the local nature
of some state problems may result in their being overlooked by Congress, or,
alternatively, that they may be such that Congress is incapable of adequately dealing
with them. See, e.g., South Carolina Hwy. llep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
185-86, 196 (1937) where, in upholding a South Carolina statute setting truck width
and weight maximums against a challenge that the enactment violated the commerce
clause, the Court stated:
[T]here are matters of local concern, the regulation of which unavoidably
involves some regulation of interstate commerce but which, because of
their local character and their number and diversity; may never be fully
dealt with by Congress. Notwithstanding the commerce clause, such reg-
ulation in the absence of Congressional action has for the most part been
left to the state ....
Id. at 185. In such situations, the Court has reasoned that holding the State powerless
under the commerce clause to rectify a certain local problem may result in the problem
not being corrected at all. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex ref. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (dicta); South Carolina Hwy. Dept v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303
U.S. 177, 185 (1938).
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II. POSSIBLE RATIONALES UNDERLYING THE HUGHES PURCHASING
EXCLUSION
A. The "Proprietary Activity" Rationale
Although the Hughes purchasing exclusion clearly limits the
availability of commerce clause review of certain types of state legisla-
tion which create an indirect burden on commerce, the underlying
rationale employed by the Hughes Court in excluding state purchasing
from review is not readily apparent. The Hughes Court noted only
that Injothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause" re-
quires that state purchasing activity be subject to the constraints of the
clause." In light of this rather obscure language, therefore, reference
must be made to the case law in an attempt to elucidate the reasons
underlying the Court's decision.
A search of the relevant case law reveals that the only type of
state activity excluded from commerce clause review prior to Hughes
was state proprietary activity alleged to burden interstate commerce
indirectly." Moreover, the cases involving this proprietary exclusion
uniformly concerned state purchasing activity. It is noteworthy in this
respect that the Hughes Court similarly characterized Maryland's activ-
ity as that of a "purchaser."82 Although this proprietary exclusion has
never been expressly sanctioned by the Supreme Court, the Court has
affirmed, in a memorandum opinion, a district court decision ex-
pressly based on this proprietary exclusion to commerce clause re-
view."
In light of the foregoing considerations, the fact that Maryland
contended at the district court level that the bounty scheme consti-
tuted proprietary activity and was thus exempt from commerce clause
review" acquires increased significance in searching for the rationale
underlying the Court's holding. Additionally, several features of the
Hughes majority opinion seem to suggest that the Hughes Court is
either (1) implicitly adopting the proprietary exclusion, or (2) using an
analysis similar to that employed by courts when applying the pro-
prietary exclusion as a vehicle to create a new, broader exclusion to
commerce clause review."
1, The Proprietary Exclusion to Commerce Clause Review.
The proprietary activity exclusion to commerce clause review is
premised on the theory that government powers are divisible into two
85 426 U.S. at 810.
81 See cases cited in note 104 infra.
"' 426 U.S. at 808.
" American Yearbook v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721, 725 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
" 4 391 F. Supp. at 54.
a5 See text at notes 122-29 infra.
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types: "governmental" and "proprietary."'" Governmental powers are
those exercised by government in its public rule-making capacity,"
and they constitute the mechanism through which the government
acts as sovereign." Thus, for example, a government uses its govern-
mental powers when it operates a police department." In contrast,
proprietary powers are those exercised by the State when it acts to
promote either its own private advantage or that of its citizens." A
government acts in its proprietary role, for example, when it enters
B"See, e.g., American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721 (M.D. Fla.)
(mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972), where the district court distinguished between
these two types of power:
Governments in the United States traditionally possess two kinds of power:
one, governmental or public, in the exercise of which it is a sovereign and
governs its people; the other, proprietary or business, by means of which
the government acts and contracts for the private advantage of its con-
stituents and of the government itself. Each of these types of power is lim-
ited by distinct sets of rules. In order to protect the rights and freedoms of
private citizens from oppressive interference, the power of a state to gov-
ern is restricted by its own constitution and provisions of the federal con-
stitution as well. When the state exercises its proprietary or business
power, however, it is subject to no more limitation than a private in-
dividual or corporation would be in transacting the same business. While
the line between governmental and proprietary function is none too sharp-
ly drawn and is subject to modification as concepts of government are
changed to meet the demands of society, one principle remains fixed: the
letting of public contracts, particularly those providing for internal needs
of government, is a proprietary function.
Id. at 721 (footnotes omitted).
The distinction between proprietary and governmental powers originated in the
law of torts in response to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and out of the dual
character of municipal corporations. Municipal corporations, as Dean Prosser notes,
have a
curious dual character ... [oln the one hand, they are subdivisions of the
state, endowed with governmental powers and charged with governmental
functions and responsibilities. On the other they are corporate bodies, cap-
able of much the same acts as private corporations .... They are at one
and the same time a corporate entity and a government.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 at 977 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter
cited as PRossilit). As a consequence of this dual character, courts have held that munic-
ipal corporations are shielded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity for their govern-
mental acts, but are subject to tort liability for acts done in their private, proprietary ca-
pacity. Id.
"American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
88 Id.
99 See, e.g., Bryant v. Mullins, 347 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 (W.D. Va. 1972); Daniels
v. Kansas Hwy. Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 712, 482 P.2d 46, 48 (1971).
9°
 Town of Graham v. Karpark Corp., 194 F.2d 616, 619 (4th Cir. 1952) (listing,
as examples of the exercise of proprietary power, municipal contracts relating to water
supply, street lighting, gas supply, flood prevention, sewerage and the like); American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S.
904 (1972); Henry v. Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 333-34, 140 N.W. 664, 665-66 (1913); Hack
v. City of Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 387, 389, 189 N.E.2d 857, 860-61 (1963). See gener-
ally 18 E. MCQU/LLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 53.23-24, 53.29 (3rd rev, ed. 1963
and 1976 Supp.) (hereinafter referred to as McQuILLiN).
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into a contract for the construction of public buildings."' While the
proprietary/governmental distinction has legal significance in several
contexts," 2 its importance for the purposes of commerce clause review
stems from the fact that government proprietary activity is subject to
only those constitutional limitations applicable to a private citizen
doing the same act."3 Conversely, government action in its "govern-
mental," rule-making capacity triggers the whole panoply of constitu-
tional restraints on the permissible exercise of state power." 4
Courts have set forth two rationales for the proprietary exclusion
to commerce clause review. The first rationale arises from the differ-
ing constitutional limitations applicable to government action in its
governmental capacity as contrasted with those applicable when acting
in its proprietary capacity. Since proprietary activity is subject to only
those constitutional limitations applicable to individuals, the govern-
ment, like the individual, is said to have the right to contract with any
party that it wishes without being subject to commerce clause con-
straints." Consequently, when a State purchases items for its own use,
it may limit its purchasing to goods produced in-state in preference to
goods produced out-of-state without violating the commerce clause."
The second rationale for the proprietary exclusion is based on a
common law presumption that statutes which limit state purchasing to
goods produced in-state have such a marginal impact on interstate
commerce that these statutes are inherently incapable of violating the
commerce clause." 7 This presumption, in turn, is premised on the
" See, e.g., Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 334, 266 P. 214, 216-17 (1928) (con-
struction of state courthouse).
92 For example, in the law of torts, this distinction is still viable for determining
whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity can be asserted by a government as a de-
fense against tort liability. See PROSSER, supra note 86, § 131 at 975-984.
At one time, this distinction was applied to determine whether state activities
were taxable under federal tax laws. Proprietary state activities were taxable, while gov-
ernmental activities were not taxable under the doctrine of intergovernmental im-
munity. See, e.g., Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368-69 (1934); South Carolina v.
United States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905). In 1946 the Supreme Court abandoned this di-
stinction for tax purposes as being untenable. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
580 (1946).
The proprietary/governmental distinction also has current relevance in the law of
municipal corporations for determining whether contracts entered into by elected
municipal officers which have a duration longer than their term in office are binding
upon their successors. According to this distinction, if the contract is created to further
an exercise of the city's proprietary functions, it is binding on the successor officers,
while if it is entered into to promote the city's governmental functions, it does not bind
the successors. See, e.g., City of Riviera Beach v, Witt, 286 So.2d 574, 574-75 (Fla. App,
1973). See generally 10 McQuii.i,iN.supra note 90, § 29.101 at 491-98.
ua American Year Book Co. v. Askew, 939 F. Supp. 719, 721 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
m Id.
as Id. at 722. See also State ex re/. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery
Co„ 115 Miss. 254, 260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v.
Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898).
ss See cases cited at note 95 supra.
97
 American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.),
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theory that state legislation is suspect under the commerce clause only
insofar as it creates a significant burden on commerce. Proprietary ac-
tivity, according to this rationale, is presumed to be incapable of cre-
ating a substantial burden on commerce. Thus subjecting such state
activity to commerce clause review is considered to be unwarranted. 98
Three factors have been present in all of the situations to which
courts have applied the proprietary exclusion. First, the proprietary
exclusion has been applied where the State has been purchasing items
for its own private advantage, as opposed to attempting to directly
promote some governmental or police power objective. 99 Second, the
State has been engaged in actually purchasing items for its own end
use; that is, the government was acquiring legal title to and possession
of articles of interstate commerce.'" Third, the exclusion has been
applied only in instances where the government has or will become an
actual party to a contract for the purchase of goods."'
Although each of these three factors has been present in cases
applying the proprietary exclusion, the relevant case law does not
make clear whether the application of the exclusion is predicated on
the coincidence of each of these three elements. Nevertheless, since
proprietary activity is, definitionally, activity in which the government
is acting for its own private advantage, rather than seeking directly to
promote some governmental goal,'" government action for its private
advantage is necessarily a prerequisite to finding that application of
the proprietary exclusion is proper. This prerequisite, however, means
merely that the State must be acting as a proprietor and thus must be
purchasing in a manner designed to conserve the government's finan-
cial resources by obtaining business advantages such as favorable con-
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Station-
ery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 261, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917). But el Garden State Dairies of
Vineland, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 358, 217 A.2d 126, 130 (1966) (criticizing the valid-
ity of this presumption in light of the increased amount of State proprietary activity).
99 See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115
Miss. 254, 261, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917). Cf. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U.S. 618,
623 (1904).
99
 American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721, 725 (M.D. Fla.)
(mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); Ex pane Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 741-42, 119
P. 298, 301-02 (1911).
100
 For examples of the types of items acquired, see American Yearbook Co. v.
Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 720, 725 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972)
(school yearbooks); Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 333-34, 266 P. 214, 216-17 (1928)
(stone used in public buildings); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Station-
ery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 258, 260.61, 76 So. 258, 259-61 (1917) (printed government
forms).
1 " Contracts leading to the purchase of goods existed, for example, in American
Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 719-20 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), affd mem., 409
U.S. 904 (1972); Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 330, 266 P. 214, 215 (1928); Ex parte
Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 735, 119 P. 298, 299 (1911); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia
Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 256, 76 So. 258, 259 (1917); Allen v. Lab-
sap, 188 Mo. 692, 696, 87 S.W. 926, 927 (1905).
Hz See cases cited at note 99 supra.
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tract terms. 103 Accordingly, this private advantage limitation does not
imply that the items purchased cannot ultimately be used to promote
a governmental rather than proprietary goal. 104
A second prerequisite to the operation of the proprietary exclu-
sion seems to be that the government is acting for its own end use.
This condition for applying the proprietary exclusion arises because
proprietary activity is necessarily government action for its own pri-
vate benefit. 105 In this context, the essential feature of private pur-
chasing is the acquisition of either legal rights or possession of the ar-
ticle purchased, or both.'"
While it therefore appears that a government must be acting
both for its private advantage and using the items for its own end use
for the proprietary exclusion to apply, the third factor always present
in the previous proprietary exclusion cases—the existence of an actual
contract—does not appear to be a necessary limitation on the availabil-
ity of the proprietary purchasing exclusion. This conclusion follows
from the fact that a government may obtain legal title to or possession
of articles of interstate commerce through means other than con-
tracts.'° 7 The existence of an actual contract thus does not appear to
be a necessary condition for the exclusion, but is instead merely a re-
sult flowing from the fact that, in practical terms, the creation of a
contractual relationship is the predominant mechanism through which
a government purchases items in a modern economy.'"
"3 See Cases cited at note 104 infra.
1 " Cf. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 719, 720, 725 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), affil
mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (printed forms used by the State); Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo.
329, 330, 333-34, 266 P. 214, 215, 216-17 (1928) (building materials for courthouse);
State ex rel. Collins v. Senatohia Blank Book & Stationery Go., 115 Miss. 254, 258, 260,
76 So. 258, 259-61 (1917) (same); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D.
591, 593, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 904, 906 (1898) (printed forms).
155 See cases cited at note 99 supra.
1 ° 5 For cases which have concluded that the word "purchase" necessarily implies
the acquisition of legal rights to or possession of the item purchased, see, e.g. First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Chickasha v. United States, 462 F.2t1 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1972);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958); Shur v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140,
142 (2(1 Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907.
117 State purchasing can theoretically be on the basis of bartering, but as a practi-
cal matter this method is not likely to be widely used. See generally I A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS, § 4 at 8.9 (1963 ed. and 1971 Stipp.) (hereinafter cited as CoitatN).
"5 A recent case aptly illustrating both the fact pattern and the rationales in
which the proprietary exclusion to commerce clause review has been applied is Ameri-
can Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) (rnem.), of 'd mem., 409 U.S.
904 (1972). In American Yearbook, plaintiff, engaged in the business of printing and
manufacturing school yearbooks, brought a commerce clause challenge to the validity of
a Florida statute which required all public printing to be done in the State. Id. at 720
n.l. Under the statute, therefore, Florida was purchasing printing services for its own
private advantage, was purchasing for its own end use, and was looking to the forma-
tion of an actual contract to which it would be a signatory party. Due to this statute,
American Yearbook was refused contracts to print yearbooks for state-owned uni-
versities because it had no printing facilities in Florida. Id. at 720. In examining the va-
lidity of the Florida statute, the district court initially drew a distinction between pro-
prietary and governmental activities, concluding that "the letting of public contracts,
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2. The Proprietary Exclusion Applied to Hughes
Maryland contended at the district court level that its bounty
scheme constituted state proprietary activity excluded from commerce
clause review. 16" The court rejected"" this contention and concluded
that, in contrast to situations in which the proprietary exclusion has
been applied:
particularly those providing for internal needs of government, is a proprietary func-
tion.. , .", since the government is acting kr it own private advantage in letting con-
tracts for end use. Id. at 721. The court went on to note that differing standards of
constitutional review were applicable "between an exercise of a state's proprietary
power, such as placing conditions on its own public contracts, and an exercise of gov-
ernmental power, such as regulation of private industry by placing limitations on pri-
vate contracts." Id. at 722. The court stated that while the commerce clause applied to
the exercise of governmental power, proprietary activity was excluded from review
since when "the state performs a proprietary function • .. [it] stands in the shoes of a
private party who is entitled in most instances to choose where and by whom his print.
ing will be done." Id. The court also acknowledged that the proprietary exclusion was
based in part upon a presumption that proprietary statutes place only an "insubstantial
burden on interstate commerce," Id. at 725. Finally, the court drew a sharp distinction
between proprietary activity alleged to interfere with interstate commerce and govern-
mental interference with interstate commerce, and concluded, sustaining the Florida
statute against the commerce clause challenge, that "Wrack regulations [relating to pri-
vate industry] are clearly subject to commerce clause restrictions, but statutes that
merely specify conditions of state purchases are not." Id. The American Yearbook court
held, therefore, that because Florida was acting in its proprietary purchasing capacity,
the statute was not subject to commerce clause review. Id, The American Yearbook court
relied on two early Supreme Court cases, Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U.S.
618 (1904) and Atkin v. Kansas, 191 H.S. 207 (1903) as supporting its conclusion that
restrictive state proprietary purchasing statutes are immunized from commerce clause
review. 339 F. Supp. at 723-24. However, the authority of these cases for the proposi-
tion cited is questionable. In Atkin, the Court upheld a state statute limiting the working
hours of laborers employed by contractors holding state public works contracts to eight
hours a day. Atkin, 191 U.S, at 224. The Atkin Court said that the state had the power to
set maximum work hours for laborers in its contracts without violating the commerce
clause. Id. at 222-23. In doing so, the Court declared that "it belongs to the State, as the
guardian and trustee for its people , .. to prescribe the conditions upon which it will
permit public work to be clone on its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities." Id.
While Atkin supports the conclusion that a State may set its own terms for contracts, it
does not necessarily support the proposition that a State may discriminate between in-
state and out-of-state parties seeking contracts with the State.
One year later, in Field, the Court sustained against a commerce clause challenge
the validity of a municipal paving contract which required the use of foreign asphalt.
Field, 194 U.S. at 623. The Court reasoned that although the contract "will in a limited
degree affect interstate commerce," it was not one of those "direct interferences with
the freedom of such commerce that [can] bring [a] case within the exclusive domain of
Federal legislation." Id. The facts presented to the Field Court, however, did not concern
a state statute limiting state purchases to in-state producers, and thus does not necessar-
ily support the conclusion of the AmeriCan Yearbook court that statutes limiting state pur-
chases to in-state producers are not subject to commerce clause review.
1 " 391 F. Supp. at 54.
11 ° Id. at 55. In rejecting Maryland's contention that the bounty program consti-
tuted state proprietary activity, the district court expressly examined the American Year-




[Maryland] has not chosen to contract in a business context
with scrap processors and to specify conditions with respect
to the latters' performance of such contracts. Rather, in
electing to act as it did in exercising its police power to pre-
serve the State's natural resources, the State elected to act
in a traditional governmental capacity.... [Maryland's ar-
gument that it was acting in a proprietary capacity] com-
ports neither with established legal principles nor with the
facts.'"
Although Maryland did not raise the issue of whether the
bounty program was a proprietary function on appeal to the Supreme
Court,'" the Hughes Court, in reaching its decision, nevertheless
seemed to apply the type of reasoning advanced in previous pro-
prietary exclusion cases in determining that the bounty scheme was
excluded from commerce clause review. In doing so, the Court ap-
parently gave implicit sanction to the proprietary exclusion.
The conclusion that the Hughes Court implicitly adopted the
proprietary exclusion is supported by several factors. First, the Court
developed a distinction in its commerce clause analysis which parallels
the govern mental/proprietary distinction. 113
 The Court distinguished
between slate legislation leading to a direct "prohibition or ... bur-
densome reguladon" of interstate commerce—govermental rule-
making activity—which the Court said is subject to commerce clause
review, and state legislation dealing with state purchasing activity—
proprietary acitvity—which the Court held is not subject to review,'"
This sharp differentiation between types of state action burdening
commerce made for the purpose of determining whether commerce
clause review is appropriate closely mirrors the distinction drawn by
courts in applying the proprietary exclusion. 13. Second, the Hughes
Court's decision to exclude the bounty scheme from review was
triggered by its characterization of Maryland as being a "purchaser"
under the Act.'"' The fact that a State is involved in purchasing activ-
ity has previously been a central factor leading courts to conclude that
state proprietary activity is present and consequently that this activity
is exempt from commerce clause review.'" Third, the Court's conclu-
1 " 391 F. Supp. at 55. The district court's finding was consistent with a prior
Maryland decision involving a different aspect of the Act which noted, in dicta, that the
Act was an exercise of the state's police power, and thus was enacted pursuant to Mary-
land's governmental powers. Administrator, Motor Vehicles Administration v. Vogt, 267
Md. 660, 675, 299 A.2d 1, 9 (1973).
"11
 Brief for Appellee at 8.
"" 426 U.S. at 806.
14 1d. at 806, 808.
" 5 See, e.g., American Yearbook v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 721 (M,D. Fla.)
(mem.), affd mete., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
75 426 U.S. at 808,
"7
 American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.),
affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (using term "state purchases").
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sion that Irdothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
forbids a State ... from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others" 1 " conforms nearly identi-
cally with the language and the conclusion reached in prior decisions
by courts which have excluded proprietary activity from commerce
clause review.'" Fourth, the Hughes dissent, in criticizing the majori-
ty's opinion, stated that the majority was apparently adopting the pro-
prietary exclusion; it then used this determination to argue that if the
Court was in fact going to accept the exclusion, it should have ex-
pressly limited the availability of the exclusion to instances where the
State was an end use purchaser to remain consistent with prior de-
cisions excluding proprietary purchasing from commerce clause re-
view.' 2° Finally, in light of the above factors, since the proprietary ex-
clusion is the only exclusion to commerce clause review previously ac-
cepted by the courts, the similarity of the language used by courts ap-
plying the proprietary purchasing exclusion to the language used by
the Hughes majority in excluding the bounty scheme from review
seems to be more than coincidental. It therefore appears that the
Hughes Court implicitly adopted the proprietary exclusion for the
purposes of commerce clause review in reaching the conclusion that:
[U]ntil today the Court has not been asked to hold that the
entry by the State itself into the market as a purchaser, in
effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce creates a
burden upon that commerce if the State restricts its trade
to its own citizens or businesses within the State. We do not
believe the Commerce Clause was intended to require in-
dependent justification for such action."'
However, although the Hughes decision seems implicitly to adopt
the proprietary exclusion to commerce clause review, certain dis-
similarities between the facts in Hughes and those appearing in prior
• cases applying the proprietary exclusion suggest that the Court's deci-
sion in Hughes may not be limited simply to adopting the proprietary
exclusion. Instead, the decision may have created a broader exclusion
encompassing all state "purchasing," regardless of whether the pur-
"8 426 U.S. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
78 See, e.g., American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (mem.),
affd meet., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) ("Trade regulations are clearly subject to Commerce
Clause restrictions, but statutes that merely specify the conditions of state purchases are
not."); State ex rel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254,
260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917) ("[T]he state has a right to make a contract with any one
whom it pleases.... The law in question (limiting State purchases to in-state businesses)
in no way [violates the commerce clause]."); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes,
7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898) ("Viewed as a question of principle, we are
unable to see why the state is forbidden to do what an individual may certainly do with
impunity, viz. elect ... [to] purchase supplies needed in the discharge of its corporate
functions ... front those who produce the same within its own limits ....").
128 426 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 'I& at 808-09.
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chasing falls within the "proprietary activity" category. This possibility
arises because the availability of the proprietary exclusion is pre-
dicated on the state purchasing items for its own private advantage
and for its own end use.' 22
 In contrast, the circumstances surrounding
Hughes are subject to varying interpretations with respect to whether
either of these two conditions necessary to the operation of the pro-
prietary exclusion were present in the Maryland bounty scheme. In
order to fully understand the scope of the Hughes purchasing exclu-
sion, it is thus necessary to compare the traditional limitations applica-
ble to the proprietary exclusion to the facts present in Hughes.
The threshold question for comparing Hughes with the limita-
tions applicable to the proprietary exclusion is to determine the sense
in which Maryland's activity under the bounty scheme can reasonably
be characterized as "purchasing." It is noteworthy in this respect that
neither the majority opinion nor the dissent offer much by way of
analysis to illuminate how this characterization flows from Maryland's
payment of bounties for hulks. There are, however, two contractual
theories under which Maryland's bounty payments may reasonably be
so characterized. These two theories arise as corollaries to the fact that
Maryland may be viewed as either a purchaser of a service—the de-
livery and processing of abandoned vehicles—or, alternatively, as a
purchaser of goods—the abandoned vehicles themselves. The signifi-
cance of characterizing Maryland as being a purchaser of a service is
that Maryland's activities can then be viewed as fitting within the tra-
ditional confines of the proprietary exclusion.'" If, on the other
hand, Maryland is characterized as being a purchaser of goods, the
State's activity does not fit within the traditional confines of the pro-
prietary purchasing exclusion, since in that case Maryland is neither
acting for its private advantage nor purchasing for end use.'"
As suggested above, the first possible contractual theory under
which Maryland may be considered a "purchaser" is that Maryland is
a purchaser of a service. According to this theory, the bounty pay-
ment constitutes an open offer to a unilateral service contract.'" More
particularly, Maryland creates a statutory offer to pay the bounty to
licensed scrap processors, kowing that part of this payment will go to
the vehicle suppliers, in return for the aid these processors and
"'See text at notes 100.108 supra.
'" See text at notes 126-32 infra.
1 " See text at notes 133.37 infra.
155 Corbin defines a "unilateral contract" as
a promise or group of promises made by one of the contracting parties
only, usually assented to by the other or by some one acting on his be-
half.... A bilateral contract consists of mutual promises, made in ex-
change for each other by .each of the two contracting parties. In the case
of a unilateral contract, there is only one promisor; and the legal result is
that he is the only party who is under an enforceable legal duty. The other
party to this contract is the one to whom the promise is made, and he is
the only one in whom the contract creates an enforceable legal right.
I CORBIN, supra note 107, § 21 at 52.
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suppliers provide Maryland in removing bounty-eligible hulks from
Maryland's countryside. The delivery of the abandoned vehicles, in
turn, promotes Maryland's environmental objective.
This contractual analysis of the Maryland scheme sterns in part
from the definition of a bounty as a payment by the State in return
for the performance of desired acts which promote a state purpose.'"
Accordingly, the existence of the bounty scheme can he viewed as
creating a unilateral contractual offer to enter into a service contract
with the licensed scrap processors and vehicle suppliers, the accept-
ance of which is satisfied by the processors' performance of the condi-
tions of the offer."' Support for this theory of the Maryland scheme
as constituting a purchase of a service is found in the dissent's charac-
terization of the bounty scheme as a purchase of "scrap processing. "128
Under this service contract approach, Maryland is acting for its pri-
vate advantage, since it is purchasing the service of removing the
abandoned vehicles in the manner the State feels is most beneficially
designed to obtain its desired goal. Moreover, the State is acquiring
end use of the thing purchased, since the State is the end user of the
service.'" Because Maryland is acting for its private advantage and
end use under this analysis of Maryland as a purchaser of services, the
Hughes decision may thus constitute merely an adoption of the pro-
prietary exclusion since the two essential elements upon which the
exclusion is predicated are present. However, even if the Hughes deci-
sion is limited to excluding traditionally-defined proprietary purchas-
"6 Webster's Third International Dictionary (1963) defines "bounty" in part as "a
reward, premium or subsidy esp. when offered or given by a government: b:
grant to encourage an industry .. d: a payment to encourage the destruction of nox-
ious animals."
'" See generally l Constx, supra note 107, at §§ 21, 64. OF particular significance
to the analysis of Maryland's bounty offer as creating a unilateral service contract is
Corbin's statement that:
[P]ublished offers of a reward for some desired action are nearly always
offers of a unilateral contract. The offeror makes a promise in exchange
for which he asks for action or forebearance, not for a promise to act or to
forbear. Usually he does not specify the particular acts by which the de-
sired result is to be attained; it is the attainment of the result for which he
promises to pay. As in the case of other offerors, he can limit the power of
acceptance exactly as he sees fit. He can require the specific mode of pro-
ducing the result, as well as the result itself; in the absence of such a re-
quirement, the particular mode used is not material, but success in produc-
ing the result is essential.
1 CORBIN, supra note 107, at § 64.
'6 426 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting). That the dissent viewed Maryland as
a purchaser of services can be adduced from its observation that "it is clear that Mary-
land in the instant case is not 'purchasing' scrap processing for end use ...." (inferring
that the majority erred by applying the exclusion to an instance where the State is not
an end use purchaser).
126 Maryland, according to this analysis, is an end user of the service because it
receives the beneficial result of the service of removing and recycling the hulks: a
cleaner state environment. A close analogy to this type of benefit flowing from end use
of a service is that provided by service contracts relating to garbage removal, where the
benefit flowing from the service is the removal of undesirable items.
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ing from commerce clause review, this exclusion is still subject to the
criticisms which are set forth in the following secticm. 13°
However, this view of the Maryland scheme is contradicted by
the majority's characterization of Maryland as being a purchaser of
goods rather than services. The majority opinion stated that. Maryland
was a purchaser of an "article of interstate commerce."' 3 ' This fact, in
turn, brings into play the alternative contractual theory under which
Maryland may reasonably be characterized as a purchaser under the
bounty scheme. According to this alternative theory, Maryland is a
joint purchaser, with the scrap processors, of the hulks, since both the
State and the processors contribute funds toward the purchase of the
hulks from vehicle suppliers. The difficulty with the suggestion that
Maryland is a purchaser of goods, however, is that it implies that the
State may in some sense "purchase" an item while acquiring no legal
rights or title to it. 12 Nevertheless, this seems to be the approach
adopted by the majority. The significance of adopting this approach is
that. if Maryland is viewed as purchasing goods, the Hughes decision
does not fit within the traditional confines of the proprietary exclu-
sion because Maryland is neither purchasing for its private advantage
1 " See text at notes 133-182 infra. Moreover, if Hughes stands	 1_  :Or the proposition
that only state proprietary activity is excluded from commerce clause review, the deci-
sion is also subject to the criticism that the distinction between proprietary and govern-
mental activity has been widely criticized by courts and commentators as being difficult
to apply. Among the many cases which have discussed the difficulty of applying the
proprietary/governmental distinction in the tort context are Brinkman v. City of In-
dianapolis, 231 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind. App. 1967) ("The governmental-proprietary rule,
however, often produces legalistic distinctions that are only remotely related to the fun-
damental considerations of municipal tort. responsibility."); Hack v. City of Salem, 174
Ohio St. 383, 391, 189 N.E.2d 857, 862 (1963) (Gibson, J., concurring) ("['The applica-
tion of ihe [proprietary/governmental distinCtionl has caused much difficulty, and in
fact the law in this area is a tangle of disagreement and confusion."); Brown v. City of
Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 431, 160 N.W.2d 805, 806 (1968) ("Such distinctions defy logical
explanation.").
Among the commentators who have discussed the difficulty of applying the
proprietary/governmental distinction, see PaossER„cupra note 86, § 131, at 979, 982
where he says that:
[T]he classification of particular functions as governmental or proprietary
has proved to be ... confused and difficult .... There is little that can be
said for such distinctions except that they exist, that they are highly artifi-
cial, and that they make no great amount of sense. Obviously, this is an
area in which the law has sought in vain for some reasonable and logical
compromise, and has ended with a pile of jackstraws.
See also D. Dodd ridge, Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary Functions of Munk-
ipal Corporations, 23 MIGH. L. REV. 325, 325 (1925); E. Fuller and A. Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAav, L. REv. 437, 443 (1941); J. Repko, American Legal
Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROB-
LEms 214, 219-22 (1942).
'"' 426 U.S. at 808 (emphasis added). The dissent also recognized that the major-
ity scented to view Maryland as being a purchaser of goods rather than of a service,
stating that the Court concludes[ ] state economic protectionism in 'purchasing' items of
interstate commerce is not a suspect motive under the Commerce Clause ...." Id. at
824 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
1 " See cases cited in note 107 supra.
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nor for its own end use. Thus, if analyzed in these terms, Hughes goes
beyond the limitations applicable to the proprietary exclusion in two
significant ways, each of which warrants illustration by contrasting the
facts of Hughes with the traditional elements limiting the proprietary
exclusion.
First, as noted earlier, the proprietary exclusion was traditionally
applicable only in situations where a State is purchasing items for its
private advantage."3
 This private advantage limitation to the pro-
prietary exclusion required that the State, when purchasing, must
employ methods and obtain benefits similar to those utilized and ob-
tained by private proprietors when purchasing. That is, the State must
be acquiring end use of the item purchased, seeking favorable con-
tract terms, and the like.'" One corollary of this private advantage
limitation is that a government may not directly seek to promote a
governmental goal by the act of purchasing per se. When a State pur-
chases items for its private advantage, the act of purchasing is cor-
rectly characterized as "proprietary" activity even though the ultimate
purpose served by the items acquired may be to promote some gov-
ernmental rather than proprietary state function. Thus, in instances
where the article purchased is in turn utilized to promote a govern-
mental end, the purchasing itself is excluded from commerce clause
review as being proprietary activity since the State is using proprietary
means to accomplish ultimately governmental ends. In these situa-
tions, the purchasing is only an indirect mechanism effectuating a gov-
ernmental program or goal. In contrast, the Maryland statute chal-
lenged in Hughes sought directly to promote the State's environmental
objectives by the very act of purchasing. The purchasing is an integral
part of the statutory scheme by which the State's governmental ends
are obtained. Therefore, the purchasing, strictly speaking, is not pro-
prietary purchasing since Maryland is not using purchasing as an in-
dependent mechanism by which the State acts in its private capacity to
acquire items needed ultimately to accomplish its public, governmental
ends. As a consequence, since the Hughes purchasing exclusion seems
to be triggered merely by the fact of government purchasing without
regard to whether the purchasing is used to promote its private ad-
vantage or used directly to promote a governmental goal, the Hughes
exclusion permits a State to enter the interstate marketplace and pur-
posely disrupt its normal operation in order directly to promote a
state governmental goal.
The second way in which Hughes goes beyond the limitations of
the proprietary exclusion concerns the fact that the proprietary exclu-
sion is applicable only in those circumstances where a State purchases
items for its own end use, thereby obtaining legal title to and posses-
133
 See cases cited in note 100 supra. Thus, for example, in American Yearbook, set
forth at note 109 supra, Florida was acting for its private advantage in setting criteria
for determining with whom it would contract to purchase printing services and
supplies. 339 F. Supp. at 719-20.
134 See cases cited in note 106 sutra.
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sion of the item purchased. 135 In contrast, by viewing Maryland as a
purchaser of goods, as suggested by the Hughes majority, it is clear
that Maryland is not an end user, since the State is using neither the
abandoned vehicles nor the resulting scrap metal. Furthermore, Mary-
land acquires no legal rights to or possession of the hulks. The Mary-
land scheme accordingly affects the end use of these hulks only in-
sofar as it redirects the course of purely private ownership and use of
these bounty-eligible hulks away from out-of-state residents toward
local domiciliaries. Therefore, a second result of the Hughes decision is
that so long as a State may in some sense be characterized as a pur-
chaser, the State may redirect the course of private ownership of arti-
cles of interstate commerce toward in-state businesses and away from
their out-of-state competitors without running afoul of the commerce
clause.
Summarizing this comparison of the facts in Hughes with the
elements necessary to the operation of the proprietary exclusion, it
appears that if Maryland is treated as a purchaser of services, the
Hughes decision may constitute merely an implicit adoption of the
proprietary exclusion by the Court. Alternatively, if the facts in
Hughes are interpreted as making the State a purchaser of goods, as
suggested by the majority's opinion, then Hughes necessarily creates an
exclusion to commerce clause review which is broader in scope than
the proprietary exclusion. This result flows from the fact that the crit-
ical factor for the operation of the Hughes exclusion seems to be
merely the existence of state activity capable of being characterized as
purchasing, while, in contrast, the proprietary exclusion is further
predicated on the State acting kir its private advantage and end
use. ' 36
In light of this latter result, although the majority's opinion is
cloaked in language which is similar to that employed by courts apply-
ing the proprietary/governmental distinction," 7
 the use of this distinc-
tion in Hughes is unjustifiable if Maryland is considered as being a
purchaser of goods. Proprietary purchasing activity is definitionally
state purchasing for the State's own private advantage and end use. 138
In contrast, Hughes seems to exclude state purchasing from review
even though the State is not acting for its private advantage and end
use, but is instead acting to promote directly its governmental objec-
tives. In these circumstances, Maryland cannot be said to be purchas-
ing in its proprietary capacity. As a result, the Court's decision to
exclude such non-proprietary purchasing from commerce clause re-
view cannot be premised on the same rationale under. which pro-
prietary purchasing is excluded from commerce clause review, be-
cause this would make the analytical distinction between proprietary
and governmental activity devoid of any meaning. Accordingly, if the
15
 See text and cases cited at notes 100 & 106 supra.
1 " See text at notes 99-107 supra.
"'See text and cases cited at notes 113-20 supra.
198
 See text and cases cited at notes 100 & 101 supra.
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sole aim of the Hughes Court is to adopt the proprietary exclusion im-
plicitly, the decision is analytically untenable, since this result leaves
the Court in the anomalous position of appearing to adopt the exclu-
sion while simultaneously destroying its analytical basis.
Although Hughes may be untenable in terms of merely adopting
the proprietary exclusion if Maryland is treated as a purchaser of
goods, a possible explanation of the Hughes decision is that the Court
may have intended to create an exclusion broader in scope than the
proprietary exclusion, and to that end was using language similar to
the proprietary/governmental distinction only by way of analogy.
However, since the proprietary/governmental distinction provides no
analytical basis for a broad exclusion encompassing non-proprietary
purchasing the underlying rationale for the Hughes exclusion of this type
of state purchasing from commerce clause review must rest on some other
basis.
B. The "Essential Governmental Functions" Rationale
Since Maryland's bounty scheme admittedly burdens commerce,
the fact that this purchasing is nevertheless excluded from commerce
clause review may imply that some countervailing constitutional in-
terest is served by the exclusion, insofar as the exclusion is not pre-
mised on the proprietary/governmental distinction. Moreover, since
the exclusion inures to the benefit of the States by freeing them from
the fetters of the commerce clause in the area of state purchasing, it
follows that some constitutionally-protected state right may be in-
volved. By thus narrowing the investigation for the probable rationale
underlying the Hughes decision to the area of state power under the
commerce clause, the relevance of National League of Cities v. Usery' 39
becomes readily apparent. In National League of Cities, the Court held
that the commerce clause did not allow federal intrusion into the area
of traditional state governmental functions.' 4° The significance of Na-
tional League of Cities in this context to the Hughes decision is enhanced
by Justice Brennan's dissenting comment that Hughes may be pre-
mised on the same traditional governmental function concept as that
set forth by the majority in National League of Cities."' As noted ear-
lier, if the Hughes majority's contention that Maryland is a purchaser
of goods is accepted, an alternative rationale for Hughes other than
the proprietary exclusion is necessary. This fact, coupled with Justice
Brennan's comment, requires a careful examination of National League
of Cities. •
National League of Cities involved a commerce clause challenge to
the validity of certain amendments"' to the federally-enacted Fair
139
 426 U.S. 833 (1976), noted in 18 13.C. IND.& COM, L. REV. 736 (1977).
"° Id. at 852.
'" Hughes, 426 U.S. at 822 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836-37. The challenged amendments,
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Labor Standards Act. 1 A 3 These amendments extended the Act's
minimum wage and maximum hours provisions to nearly all persons
employed by the States and their political subdivisions.' 44
 The Court
held the amendments invalid insofar as Congress had attempted to
regulate the wages and hours of state employees engaged in "tradi-
tional governmental functions."'" The Court reasoned that Congress,
notwithstanding its broad power under the commerce clause, could
not exercise this power in a manner which impaired the States' ability
to function as States.' 4" This conclusion rested on the Court's de-
termination that the interests of federalism mandated that essential
state functions must be free from federal control. 147
 The Court drew
a distinction, closely analogous to the proprietary/governmental dis-
tinction, between "traditional governmental" functions and other gov-
ernmental activities.'" In accord with this distinction, the Court held
that the commerce clause did not give Congress the power to pre-
scribe the manner in which a State seeks to provide the governmental
services which the Court denominated as being "essential" and "tradi-
tional," 149 although Congress did have the power to regulate the
wages and hours of those state employees performing other, non-
traditional duties.'"
The Court's determination in National League of Cities that con-
enacted in 1974, amended 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970) to include "public agency" in the
definition of an "employer" covered under the Act. Moreover, the definition of "rein-
terprise engaged, in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce", id. at §
203(s), was amended to include "activitfiesi of a public agency." Id. at § 203(s)(5) (1970
and Supp. IV 1974).
"43 1d. al §§ 201-219 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974).
144 Id.	 §§ 203(d), 203(s)(5).
'" 426 U.S. at 852,
"" Id. at 845, 852.
147 Id. at 852, The Court noted that under the amendments "Congress has sought
to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the States' 'ability to function effec-
tively in a federal system' , This exercise of congressional authority does not com-
port with the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution." Id.
I"
 Id. at 851-52. The Court defined these "traditional governmental functions"
as those functions exercised "by the States in their capacities as sovereign governments",
id. at 852, which comports closely with the usual definition of "governmental" functions
in the governmental/proprietary dichotomy. See note 86 supra.
I4U
 426 U.S. at 852, The Court held that "insofar as the challenged amendments
operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted Con-
gress by [the commerce clause]." N.
15 ° Id. at 854 n.18. The Court at this point discussed United States v. CalifOrnia,
297 U.S. 175 (1936), wherein the Court held that congressional legislation under the
commerce clause regulating railroads could properly reach a railroad operated by a
State. Id, at 188-89. The National League of Cities Court noted that this decision was
"quite consistent with our holding today. There California's activity to which the con-
gressional command was directed was not in an area that the States have regarded as
integral parts of their governmental activities." 426 U.S. at 854 11,18. It is significant
that government operation of a transportation system is usually categorized as a "pro-
prietary activity", sre, e.g., Tobin v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash. 664, 672, 221 P. 583, 586
(1923).
919
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
gressional power under the commerce clause does not extend so far as
to allow Congress to restrict a State's choice of the manner in which it
decides to provide an essential government service may also provide a
partial rationale for the Court's decision in Hughes. This possibility
takes two alternative forms. First, a State's power to purchase may it-
self be considered an independent essential governmental function
when exercised to further a governmental objective. According to this
analysis, a State's power to purchase to promote a governmental goal
is itself a necessary attribute of State sovereignty similar to the other
essential State functions listed by the National League of Cities Court. As
such, the interests of federalism require that state purchasing for such
purposes be free from review under the commerce clause."' The sec-
ond, alternative, rationale for the Hughes decision provided by Na-
tional League of Cities is that the latter case may be interpreted as hold-
ing that the commerce clause, as either an affirmative grant of power
to Congress or as a constraint on state legislation, does not permit
federal interference in the manner through which a State seeks to pro-
151
	 analysis that Stale purchasing, when employed to promote a traditional
governmental function, is itself a traditional governmental function not subject to review
under the commerce clause finds support in the National League of Cities Court's state-
ment that:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to de-
termine the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order
to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will
work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may
be called upon to work overtime.
426 U.S. at 845. The Court went on to state that:
The question we must resolve here, then, is whether these determinations
[by the States regarding wages and hours applicable to employees engaged
in carrying out traditional governmental functions] are 'functions essential
to [the] separate and independent existence [of the States] ... so that
Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority to make
them.
Id. at 845-46. If, as the National League of Cities Court holds, a State's decision as to the
conditions under which it will "purchase" labor in order to promote essential govern-
mental functions is itself an essential governmental function such that Congress can not
regulate the state's activity in this area, it is only a short step to determine that state
"purchasing" of' goods, instead of labor, which similarly promotes traditional govern-
mental functions, is likewise an essential state function which the commerce clause does
not reach. It is significant that the National League of Cities Court, in discussing tradi-
tional governmental functions, specifically mentioned "sanitation" as an example. Id. at
851. The Maryland bounty program was established to promote. environmental cleanli-
ness. According to testimony in Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt,
267 Md. 660, 299 A.2d 1 (1973), which involved a different aspect of the Maryland
bounty scheme, the problem posed by abandoned automobiles "had become a cause for
concern in terms of environmental health. There was evidence, For example, that some
hulks [had] remained undisturbed so long that they [had] become infested with ro-
dents." Id. at 670, 299 A.2d at 6. Therefore, since the bounty scheme promotes a Mary-
land sanitation goal, which is a traditional governmental function, state purchasing
promoting this goal may also be considered a traditional governmental function which
would likewise be outside the scope of commerce clause review under the National
League of Cities rationale.
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vide essential governmental services to its citizens.'" Pursuant to this
analysis, Maryland's purchasing under its bounty scheme is not subject
to review because purchasing is the mechanism chosen by Maryland
throUgh which it seeks to provide the essential governmental service
of maintaining a clean environment.'" While these two alternative
theories arising from National League of Cities in support of the result
reached in Hughes are analytically separable, they both provide a ra-
tionale for excluding from commerce clause review state purchasing
which directly promotes an essential governmental function.
C. The Proprietar), Exclusion and Essential Governmental Function
Rationales Combined
By combining the results of the proprietziry exclusion with the
results of the essential state functions analysis of state purchasing de-
duced from National League of Cities, every type of state purchasing
is excluded from commerce clause review. On one hand, state pur-
chasing for prorpietary purposes is excluded from commerce clause
review on the basis of the proprietary exclusion.'" On the other
hand, state governmental, "non-proprietary" purchasing is excluded
from commerce clause review under one of the alternative essential
governmental function theories provided by National League of
Cities. ''' " Thus, combining these concepts makes the Court's holding in
Hughes that all state purchasing is excluded from review analytically
defensible, although the underlying analytical basis for the purchasing
exclusion differs depending upon the purpose animating the state
purchasing.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE HUGHES PURCHASING EXCLUSION
Regardless of whether Hughes is viewed as excluding both pro-
prietary and non-proprietary purchasing from commerce clause re-
view, or whether it is viewed as merely constituting an implicit adop-
tion of the proprietary exclusion, the holding in Hughes is vulnerable
to criticism on several grounds.
The first criticism is that the decision conflicts with well-reasoned
152 The analysis that the commerce clause does nut reach the manner in which a
State seeks to provide an essential governmental function arises from the Court's state-
ment in National League qf Cities that "Congress [under the Commerce Clause] may nut
exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential
decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made."
426 U.S. at 855. Following this rationale, it would appear that if Congress in the exer-
cise of its affirmative grant of power cannot prescribe or affect the manner in which
States seek to provide essential governmental services, then likewise the commerce
clause of its own force fails to prescribe the manner in which a State may permissibly
seek to accomplish essential state functions.
'" See note 152 supra.
' 54 See text at notes 86-98.CUPra
"5 See text at notes 142-52 supra.
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Supreme Court precedent regarding the scope of commerce clause
review. Previously, when faced with state action alleged to burden in-
terstate commerce, the Court has subjected all such legislation to
commerce clause review.' 56
 In doing so, the Court has observed that
"[t]he commerce clause forbids discrimination, whether forthright or
ingenious. In each case it is [the Court's] duty to determine whether
the statute under attack, whatever its name may be, will in its practical
operation work discrimination against interstate commerce."t 57
 The
Court has further noted that. judicial review of all state action.alleged
to burden commerce is necessary to achieve the purpose underlying
the commerce clause. This purpose, in turn, is to transform the sepa-
rate States into a national free-trade zone where state boundaries pre-
sent no obstacles to commerce.'" Thus, the Court has focused on the
effect of the state action on interstate commerce, rather than on the
type of state activity involved, in determining whether the statute in-
volved violated the commerce clause.' 59
 Prior Supreme Court pre-
cedent also suggests that arbitrary categories such as "proprietary,"
"governmental" and "essential State functions" are irrelevant for de-
termining the scope of commerce clause review, since the operation of
the commerce clause is triggered by the existence of discrimination
against interstate commerce rather than by discriminatory burdens
created only by a particular type of state activity.' 60
 The Court has ac-
cordingly pointed out that "Mormulas and catchwords are sub-
ordinate to [the] overmastering requirement" that one State may not
discriminate against the businesses of another.'" Therefore, in light
of these prior cases indicating that the purposes of the commerce
clause can only be obtained by applying it broadly to review any State
activity which burdens commerce, Hughes, if interpreted as merely
adopting the proprietary exclusion, creates an arbitrary exclusion to
1"
 See, e.g., Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71, 381
(1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
"T Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940) (emphasis added).
" 8
 Prior Supreme Court cases stating that the purpose of the commerce clause is
to create a free trade area within the United States include Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539
(1949); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
16
 Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976); Polar Ice
Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 376-77 (1964); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). But el: National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (wherein the Court's decision hinged on the type of state activity
involved), See text at notes 142-52 supra.
' 6° See cases cited in note 159 supra.
' 6 ' Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935). Since Alexandria, in
order to obtain the bounty-eligible vehicles, would have to move its operations into
Maryland, prior case law suggests that this result on interstate commerce is particularly
suspect. In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), the Court noted that
the practical effect of a State administrator's order was to force respondent company to
relocate its business operations in the home State from its current location outside the




commerce clause review that is both unwarranted and contrary to the
underlying purpose of the commerce clause.
Furthermore, if Hughes creates a broader exclusion to commerce
clause review than that created by the proprietary exclusion,'" the
decision is similarly subject to the criticism that it creates an arbitrary
exclusion contrary to the purposesk animating the commerce clause.
Even if National League of Cities provides an analytical basis for exclud-
ing state purchasing activity which promotes essential state functions,
Hughes creates an exclusion broader, than that required by the consid-
erations of federalism which animated the Court's National League of
Cities decision. This conclusion stems from the fact that Hughes
excludes all purchasing activity from commerce clause review regard-
less of whether the state purchasing is for proprietary or govern-
mental ends. Accordingly, even if the National League of Cities doctrine
is accepted as providing a basis for excluding some state purchasing
from commerce-clause review,lit does not provide an independent jus-
tification for excluding proprietary purchasing from review. It is
therefore clear that the Hughes purchasing exclusion runs counter to
prior well-reasoned Supreme Court precedent in the commerce clause
area, and accordingly inhibits the free-trade goals inherent in the
commerce clause. Moreover, the breadth of the exclusion created by
Hughes assures that•this inhibition will occur even in those instances
where no constitutionally-mandated' interest in federalism is promoted
thereby.
The second criticism to which the Hughes purchasing exclusion is
vulnerable is that state statutes giving preference to home-state busi-
nesses have a potentially significant, impact on interstate commerce in
light of the expanding economic role the States play in the national
economy, both in their governmental and proprietary capacities. Un-
derlying the exclusion of proprietary purchasing activity from com-
merce clause review is a presumption that preferential state purchas-
ing statutes inherently have a minimal impact on interstate com-
merce.'" However, this rationale as to proprietary purchasing was
developed in the early part of the twentieth century, when the level of
state proprietary spending was indeed rather small. 16 " In light of the
dramatic increase in state and local spending in the last several de-
illhe Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring
business operations to be performed in the home State that could more ef-
ficiently be •performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a
clearly legitimate :local interest, this particular burden on commerce has
been declared to be virtually per se illegal.
Id. See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-04, 406 (1948); Foster-Fountain Pack-
ing Co. v. Flaydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928).
'" See text at notes 131-35 supra.
163 See text at notes 97-98 supra.
•	 j " Note, for example, that two of the leading cases in this area, Tribune Printing
and Binding Co. V. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 75 N.W. 904 and State ex rel. Collins v.
Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115 Miss, 254, 76 So. 258, were decided in
1898 and 1917, respectively.
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cades, 1 B 5
 it is no longer axiomatic that home-state purchasing statutes
fail to place a substantial burden on interstate commerce." There-
fore, the presumption that preferential purchasing statutes inherently
have such a marginal impact as to fail to burden interstate commerce
is of dubious factual validity.'" When the totality of governmental as
well as proprietary purchasing is considered, the possible adverse ef-
fects preferential state purchasing may have on interstate commerce is
indeed substantial, and thus state purchasing should not be totally
excluded from commerce clause review.
The third criticism to which the Hughes purchasing exclusion is
vulnerable is that it allows state purchasing activity to have an adverse
effect on the purely private end use of articles of interstate commerce,
without subjecting this result to scrutiny under the commerce clause.
As the analysis of Maryland as a purchaser of services illustrates, the
proprietary exclusion allows States to redirect the course of end use of
articles of interstate commerce into the hands of in-state businesses at
the expense of out-of-state competitors. A similar result occurs under
the analysis of Maryland as a purchaser of vehicles under the
amendment, since the legislation involved in Hughes concerned state
purchasing in which the state was not an end use purchaser of the
vehicles. The sole effect of the amendment was to redirect hulks away
from Alexandria and other out-of-state processors toward Maryland
processors. Hughes thus allows States to act in ways which disrupt the
normal course of ownership of articles of interstate commerce, so long
as its actions can in some fashion be characterized as purchasing.
A likely result of the Hughes exclusion is that a State, particularly
in times of high unemployment, will be tempted to act in its purchaser
capacity to pay a small bounty for goods produced in-state and
thereby purposefully redirect interstate commerce away from more
efficient out-of-state producers to the "purchasing" State in order to
increase employment in the State and to broaden its tax base. As the
i's The total amount of direct general expenditures by state and local govern-
ments for 1973 was slightly in excess of 181 billion dollars. Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1975.
"6 See Note, Home-State Preferences in Public Contracting: A Study in Economic Bal-
kanization, 58 IowA L. REv. 576, 591-95 (1973), where the author, based on a self-
conducted survey and other statistical data, argues that the burden placed on interstate
commerce by home-state preference purchasing statutes is significant and that this fact
should lead courts to abandon the proprietary exclusion altogether. The total amount
of state and local spending, referred to in note 165 supra, is particularly significant since
the following types of activities have been deemed proprietary: supplying gas, water or
electricity; operating ferries, wharves, docks, airports, garages and housing units; con-
structing an maintaining streets and highways. See generally, PROSSER, supra note 89, at §
131 at 981; 18 McguiLLIN,supra note 90, § 53.30a at 197-98.
187
 The increasing amount of State and local proprietary activity has already led
one court to criticize the proprietary exclusion due to the impact of such activity on in-
terstate commerce. In Garden State Dairies of Vineland, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217
A.2d 126 (1966), the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: "in the light of the expanding
proprietary activities of the states, [the proprietary exclusion] could prove to be ... very
troublesome ... and is not to be looked upon with favor." Id. at 358, 217 A.2d at 130.
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amount of this bounty increases, this redirection of interstate com-
merce becomes increasingly certain from an economic standpoint.
This effect will result in damaging the economies of other States not
having similar programs.'" Therefore, the Hughes purchasing exclu-
sion holds the possibility of creating interstate commercial warfare as
States compete to create the most favorable mix of "bounties" insulat-
ing in-state businesses from out-of-state competition. Yet this result is
precisely the situation which the commerce clause was established to
prevent, since the goal of the clause is to turn the United States into a
free-trade zone where artificial, state-imposed restraints on commerce
are not allowed to interfere with the natural operation of the in-
terstate market.'" In light of such potentially severe ramifications, it
therefore seems particularly inappropriate that the Hughes Court de-
cided to forego all commerce clause analysis and to hold that the
Maryland legislation was not reviewable under the commerce clause.
A fourth criticism to which the Hughes purchasing exclusion is
vulnerable is that Hughes allows a State, in the pursuit of its police
power goals, to alter the normal course of private ownership of goods
in interstate commerce when acting in its "purchaser" capacity, but is
forbidden to achieve the same result 'on interstate commerce through
legislation regulating private conduct enacted in the State's traditional
"governmental" role. This result flows from the Hughes Court's ex-
press acknowledgement that the legislative intention underpinning the
Maryland bounty program was to clean up the State's environment."°
Therefore, as legislation seeking to promote public health and safety,
the Maryland act is an exercise of the State's police power."' In the
past, when confronted with police power enactments alleged to violate
the commerce clause, the Court has often held that a police power
enactment is subject to review in the same manner as any other legis-
lation. 172 The Court in these cases has reasoned that if a statute is
deemed excluded from commerce clause review simply because it is a
police power enactment, the commerce clause would not impose any
limitations on state action, "save for the rare instance where a state
artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate
goods."'" In contrast to these situations where the Court has held
1 " This result occurs because at some 'point the amount of the bounty will be
greater than any diseconomies resulting from plant relocation, making the choice to
remain outside the bounty-conferring state economically irrational.
"" See text and cases cited at note 160 supra,
' 70 426 U.S. at 809. The Court noted that "Maryland entered the market for the
purpose, agreed by all to be commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting the State's
environment." Id.
'' See Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 675,
299 A.2d I, 9 (1973), where a Maryland court noted that the statute subsequently in-
volved in Hughes was enacted pursuant to the State's police power.
1 " See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
1 " Id. at 354.
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commerce clause review of police power enactments is appropriate,
Hughes allows a State to circumvent commerce clause review in situa-
tions where the State promotes police power goals by means of state
"purchasing." Thus, Hughes allows differing commerce clause treat-
ment of similar results merely because the type of state action in-
volved is different. This criticism of Hughes is applicable regardless of
whether the decision is viewed as simply adopting the proprietary ex-
clusion or as including both proprietary and non-proprietary purchas-
ing. On one hand, if Hughes is interpreted as adopting the proprietary
exdusion, the decision allows a State to exercise its proprietary pur-
chasing power to promote a police power objective in a manner which
redirects the end use of articles of interstate commerce into the hands
of in-state businesses at the expense of their out-of-state competitors.
On the other hand, if Hughes is interpreted as excluding non-
proprietary as well as proprietary purchasing, the decision allows a
State to intervene directly in the market to promote a governmental
objective in its purchaser capacity in a manner which similarly bur-
dens interstate commerce.
The anomaly of this result is highlighted by the Hughes Court's
indication that the operation of the commerce clause is triggered only
by state legislation which both directly prohibits or substantially bur-
dens interstate commerce. Since the practical effect of the 1974
amendment involved in Hughes is to require that hulks be processed in
Maryland, the Hughes purchasing exclusion allows a State to burden
interstate commerce to promote police power objectives if it does so in
its purchasing capacity, while subjecting exactly the same burden on
interstate commerce to commerce clause review if it creates the bur-
den by legislation regulating private behavior. It therefore appears
that if Maryland by legislative fiat had required all abandoned au-
tomobiles to be processed within Maryland, the Court would haVe
held the legislation to be a proper subject of commerce clause review.
Since presumably the commerce clause interest in maintaining a na-
tional marketplace remains the same regardless of the manner in
which a State interferes with interstate commerce, state purchasing ac-
tivity should not be accorded the unique position of being totally
excluded from commerce clause review.
A fifth criticism of the Hughes purchasing exclusion is that the
exclusion does not seem susceptible to any limiting principles. The
exclusion seems to be triggered simply by the fact of state purchasing,
regardless of the degree to which the state activity disrupts interstate
commerce. This aspect of the exclusion announced in Hughes was par-
ticularly troublesome to the dissent, which stated that the exclusion
had the possibility of creating the equivalent of a "rampart of customs
duties" leading to severe diseconomies in the national market.' 74
There are, however, two possible constructions of the Hughes
exclusion which would limit the adverse effects of the purchasing ex-
114
 426 U.S. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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elusion on interstate commerce. The first possible limitation is
suggested by the analysis employed by Justice Stevens in his concur-
ring opinion. Justice Stevens contended that the critical factor in
Hughes was that the Maryland bounty program created, rather than re-
stricted, interstate commerce.'" In doing so, he distinguished between
"commerce which flourishes in a free market and commerce which
owes its existence to a state subsidy program," and concluded that the
situation presented by Hughes fell into the latter category.'" This con-
clusion led Justice Stevens to determine that Hughes was correctly de-
cided since, in his view, the commerce clause does not reach instances
in which a State creates new commerce but only applies to situations
in which a State disrupts pre-existing commerce.'" Thus, one limita-
tion to the Hughes purchasing exclusion may be that it is triggered
only in instances where the State subsidizes a type of business activity
which previously did not exist, in order to promote some govern-
mental purpose, but is inapplicable whenever such a subsidy program
interferes with the natural operation of a pre-existing interstate mar-
ket.
Although the Court in the future could apply the limitation
suggested by the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, future use of
this suggested limitation would require the Court to ignore three im-
portant facts concerning the Hughes decision. First, Justice Stevens' as-
sertion that Maryland "created" a market has absolutely no support in
the record. Since Alexandria alleged that 40% of its supply of hulks
originated in Maryland,'" the logical inference is that 60% of its sup-
ply originated from States in which there were no bounty programs.
It is therefore difficult to characterize the interstate market in vehicle
hulks as one owing its entire existence to a state subsidy program.
Second, Justice Stevens' assertion that Maryland created the market is
belied by the majority's note that Alexandria's supplies from non-
Maryland sources increased significantly after the effective date of the
1974 amendment.'" Third, no support can be found for Justice Ste-
vens' position in the broad language employed by the majority, which
seemingly excludes all state purchasing from commerce clause review.
A second possible limiting principle to the application of the
Hughes purchasing exclusion is suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent.
Justice Brennan intimated that Hughes may be limited to instances in
which a State is "truly regulating matters of local concern respecting
its environment and there is as a practical matter an absence of 'rea-
18 1d. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"8 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
" 7 Id. at 817 (Stevens, J,, concurring),
18 Appellee's Brief at 18. The figure is for 1974.
1 " 426 U.S. at 801 n.11. The Court noted that in the six months following the
effective date of the amendment, the number of bounty-eligible vehicles delivered to
Alexandria declined by 31.8% "at a time when appellee's figures showed an increase of
11.9% in the number of vehicles supplied from non-Maryland sources," Id. (emphasis in
original).
927
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
sonably nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legiti-
mate local interests.' "'" However, this suggestion appears to be un-
tenable on two grounds. First, as Justice Brennan admitted, there is
no inference in the Hughes majority opinion that the purchasing ex-
clusion is limited to such circumstances. 1 e' Secondly, the district court
held that the 1974 amendment violated the commerce clause precisely
because there were, in fact, alternative means available to Maryland
which were less burdensome to interstate commerce by which the
State could promote its legitimate environmental objectives.'"
In light of these considerations, it appears that both of the possi-
ble limitations to the Hughes purchasing exclusion suggested by the
opinions in Hughes seem to be untenable, and thus the development
of limiting principles to this exclusion must await future Supreme
Court pronouncements on the scope of the purchasing exclusion.
Since searching the various aspects of the decision fails to reveal any
sure limiting principles, Hughes, as it currently stands, provides a
mechanism through which States may circumvent the restraints of the
commerce clause by acting as a purchaser to promote governmental
goals in a manner which creates a burden on interstate commerce,
rather than by seeking to promote these governmental goals through
regulation of private behavior which, if burdensome to interstate
commerce, would be subject to commerce clause review.
CONCLUSION
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. constitutes an unwarranted de-
parture from the oft-stated concept that the goal of the commerce
clause is to weld the United States into an integrated economic unit
where state boundaries present no impediment to commerce. By
creating a broad exclusion to commerce clause review whenever a
State engages in "purchasing" activity, the Court has potentially
created a device by which the States can frustrate this goal of eco-
nomic integration. The commerce clause operates in an area where
the interests of the federal and state governments frequently collide.
The importance of these interests on both sides requires continual ac-
commodation. Therefore, in the future, the Court should reject the
summary approach taken in the Hughes decision. Whenever state legis-
lation is alleged to burden interstate commerce, the Court should
' 85 Id. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'"' Id. In discussing the lack of limiting principles in the majority's opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan stated that:
The Court fails to search fur such limiting circumstances and shuts off
analysis merely because of the form of the state regulation, thus effectively
'immunfizingr state 'statutes ... requiring that certain kinds of processing
be done in the home State before shipment to a sister State,' ... so lung as
the mode of regulation may be characterized as the state functioning as a
'purchaser: Id.
" 2 391 F. Stipp. at 63.
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make its determination only by carefully weighing the significance of
the burden placed on interstate commerce against the benefit such
legislation provides fdr the State.
WILLIAM L. THORPE
Environmental Law—Water Pollution Remedies—Application of
Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance to Intrastate Stream
Pollution—Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train.' The Committee .for the Consideration of the Jones
Falls Sewage System, together with private individuals and several
neighborhood associations, brought suit in federal district court
against the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
various individuals and state, municipal, and county agencies 2 to halt
the discharge of sewage into the Jones Falls Stream' from the local
sewage system treatment plant. 4 The plaintiffs alleged that substantial
amounts of untreated raw sewage were flowing into the stream as a
result of the insufficient capacity of the treatment plant, causing un-
acceptable levels of coliform and fecal bacteria in the strearn. 6 The
suit was intially brought under the citizen suit provision of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 6 which permits
citizens to sue any person who has violated the effluent standards
established under the Act.' The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
' 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (en bane).
2 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (D. Md. 1974). The following defendants were named
in addition to Russell Train, the Administrator of the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency: F. Pierce Linaweaver, individually and as Director of the Baltimore City
Department of Public Works; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City; C. Elmer
Hoppert, Jr., individually and as Buildings Engineer for Baltimore County; and County
Executive and County Council of Baltimore County. Id. The court later permitted Carl
M. Freeman, Trustee, Carl . M. Freeman AsSociates, Inc., and Ralph DeChiaro Enter-
prises, Inc. to intervene as defendants. 387 F. Supp. 526, 527 (D. Md. 1975).
a 375 F. Supp. at 1149. From its origin in Baltimore County the Jones Fails
Stream flows through parts of the City of Baltimore, into the Patapsco River, and ulti-
mately into Chesapeake Bay via the Baltimore Harbor. Id.
4 375 F. Supp. at 1149.
" Plaintiffs alleged that in 1973 the plant's capacity was exceeded by three million
gallons of sewage per day. 539 F.2d at 1010 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
" 33 U.S.G. §§ 1251 a seq. (Supp. V 1975).
T 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975), the citizen suit provision, confers jurisdiction
on the district courts. Section 1365(a) provides:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
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